Modal logic NL for common language by Heartspring, William
Modal logic NL for common language
William Heartspring
Abstract: Despite initial appearance, paradoxes in classical logic, when comprehension
is unrestricted, do not go away even if the law of excluded middle is dropped, unless
the law of noncontradiction is eliminated as well, which makes logic much less powerful.
Is there an alternative way to preserve unrestricted comprehension of common language,
while retaining power of classical logic? The answer is yes, when provability modal logic
is utilized. Modal logic NL is constructed for this purpose. Unless a paradox is provable,
usual rules of classical logic follow. The main point for modal logic NL is to tune the law
of excluded middle so that we allow for φ and its negation ¬φ to be both false in case a
paradox provably arises. Curry's paradox is resolved differently from other paradoxes but
is also resolved in modal logic NL. The changes allow for unrestricted comprehension and
naïve set theory, and allow us to justify use of common language in formal sense.
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1 Expressiveness of Language, No-no paradox
Ideally, logic underlies both language and mathematics. However, different paradoxes in
logic, such as the liar paradox, Russell's paradox and Fitch's paradox[1], suggest expres-
siveness of common language must be restricted. But is this really a natural conclusion?
One may ask why paradoxes are not merely of curiosity. After all, one may simply say some
statements have no meaning. Should we impose that all sentences be either true or false?
Why not the third truth value for paradoxes? For that, consider the barber paradox. The
barber A is a person who shaves all of those and only those who do not shave themselves.
This definition should be clearly non-paradoxical in common language. Yet investigated
logically, we realize that this definition contains a paradox, because if A shaves A, then the
definition of the barber is wrong, and if A does not shave A, then A should shave A by the
definition.
Also consider the following no-no paradox[2], originally by Jean Buridan, a medieval philoso-
pher. In statement (A), Socrates simply writes that Plato is lying by statement (B). In
statement (B), Plato simply writes that Socrates is lying by statement (A). There seems
no reason to restrict expressiveness of language used to write these statements. After all,
by common intuition, this is just Socrates questioning Plato's integrity, and vice versa. Yet
logically investigated, we arrive at the paradox, because of asymmetrical nature of possible
conclusions. That is, either (A) is true with (B) being false, or (B) is true with (A) being
false. But how can this be, when sentence (A) and (B) are symmetrical? This asymmetric
conclusion is not by itself a problem, but think of the case when there is nothing else hap-
pening, and we only have statement (A) and (B). Is the asymmetric conclusion then really
valid?
It is possible to go around this by adding a third truth value - indeterminate - so that a
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symmetric conclusion can be kept. Except, when we introduce the third truth value, we
can always absorb this third value to one of the two classical truth values - the natural
choice would be falsity. This would require a modification (but not an entire rejection) to
one law of classical logic - the law of excluded middle. We will soon explore this. For now,
the point is that there is nothing wrong with staying in bivalent logic.
We may avoid questions by limiting expressiveness of language, but the statements just
formulated were not simply to be treated as nonsense, to allude somewhat to Ludwig
Wittgenstein. At least they are different from obvious nonsense. Curtailment of language
expressiveness amounts to treating some commonly sensible sentences as nonsense.
We thus seek for a resolution that does not really modify classical logic machineries but
still keeps unrestricted comprehension that allows us to evaluate sentences in common
language. That is what this writing provides by constructing modal logic NL - the abbrevi-
ation for the new logic. The philosophy of NL is simple, even though actual construction
and details are not: if you prove a paradox of form p ↔ ¬p, then we should set both p
and ¬p to be false. This requires referring to provability, necessitating provability modal
logic, along with one modification and new additions to classical propositional logic. The
goal is to preserve the set of sentences that are true in all models in classical logic, which
is mapped to the set of sentences that are true in all models in NL, while allowing for
unrestricted comprehension.
2 Refinements to classical logic
What is classical propositional logic? It is defined in terms of axiom schema:
• Modus Ponens. This is not an axiom and just an inference rule.
• Then-1: p→ (q → p)
• Then-2: (p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
• And-1, And-2: p ∧ q → p, p ∧ q → q
• And-3: p→ (q → (p ∧ q))
• Or-1, Or-2: p→ p ∨ q, q → p ∨ q
• Or-3: (p→ q)→ ((r → q)→ (p ∨ r → q))
• Principle of explosion: ⊥ → p
• Not-1': (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p (Refined in the new logic)
• Not-2': ¬p→ (p→ ⊥)
• Iff-1, Iff-2: (p↔ q)→ ((p→ q) ∧ (q → p))
• Iff-3: (p→ q)→ ((q → p)→ (p↔ q))
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• Double negation elimination and introduction: ¬¬p↔ p
The axiom schema that are dropped initially from the new logic is Not-1'. Other axioms
remain intact in the new logic. In intuitionist logic the axiom schema dropped is double
negation elimination (and introduction), so this is an atypical choice. Refining Not-1' re-
flects the idea that falsity of p does not mean truth of ¬p, and both p and its negation ¬p
may turn out to be false, as required for resolution of Russell's paradox without restricting
comprehension.
Furthermore, since Curry's paradox that we wish to avoid without restricting comprehen-
sion requires invoking Then-2, there is a need to refine it as well. We keep Then-2 but
add an additional axiom (Then-4) to address Curry's paradox.
The goal is to preserve classical proofs that invoke the law of excluded middle, Not-1' or
Then-2, so Refined Not-1' and Then-4 are to be introduced as to preserve classical
proofs as valid proofs in the new logic but without having to restrict comprehension. Re-
fined Not-1' and Then-4 go, along with additional axioms, though there would have to
be more, added to the new logic as:
• Refined Not-1':
¬((p→ ¬p) ∧ (¬p→ p))→ ((p→ ⊥)→ ¬p) (2.1)
• Then-4:
(p↔ (p→ r))→ ((p→ ⊥) ∧ ((p→ r)→ ⊥)) (2.2)
• Law of noncontradiction: (p ∧ ¬p)→ ⊥
• De Morgan's laws: ¬(p ∨ q)↔ ¬p ∧ ¬q, ¬(p ∧ q)↔ ¬p ∨ ¬q
• Not-4':
((p→ ¬p) ∧ (¬p→ p))→ ¬p ∧ ¬¬p (2.3)
Then-4 has precedence over Then-2. Thus, in case of a conflict between Then-4 and
Then-2, Then-4 must be used instead.
Refined Not-1' and Not-4' are where modal operator  enters, as part of provability
logic. The logical system utilized for the modal operator is modal logic GL (also referred
to as KW). For now all that matters is that  means provable, with ♦ ≡ ¬¬. Note that
GL itself does not include axioms of classical propositional logic. Thus, the modifications
to classical propositional logic are safe to use along with GL.
(However, in existing literature, consequences of GL or S4 are often proved with some
of the axioms in classical proposition logic without explicit mentions - most of time, the
principle of explosion. Thus some cautions are required.) Also, contrapositive relation of
(p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p) does follow from the principle of explosion, despite the modification
to classical propositional logic.
The axiom set of Then-1, Then-2, Then-4, And-1, And-2, And-3, Or-1, Or-2, Or-3,
principle of explosion, Refined Not-1', Not-2', Iff-1, Iff-2, Iff-3, double negation
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elimination and introduction, law of noncontradiction, De Morgan's laws,Not-4'
and modal logic GL partially define the new logic. Let us call this logic NL-lite.
What isRefined Not-1' stating? It say that if p is not in a verifiably (provably) paradoxical
situation in the classical logic, then p resulting in contradiction (which means p is false both
in classical logic and the new logic) must mean ¬p. Thus, in usual non-paradoxical situations
of classical logic, the new logic and classical logic should agree. Not-4' says that in case a
paradox involving p and ¬p is provable, then both p and ¬p are unprovable. In addition,
in such a paradoxical case, p and ¬p cannot be true by the law of noncontradiction, and
thus they are both false.
Refined Not-1' results in a peculiar feature of NL-lite: φ that can only be proved through
classical proof by contradiction now is considered unprovable in NL-lite, and this will
not change in the full modal logic NL (the new logic). However, since we allow for the
law of excluded middle when no paradox can be proven for φ, it is still true that for non-
paradoxical classical non-modal propositions, all existing proofs of p are valid. It is just
that p no longer holds if proving p requires a proof by contradiction. All these proofs of p
that do not have p are considered post-proofs which do not satisfy ` p, since one cannot
prove p within finite deductions. It requires infinite deductions to prove p, with all models
demonstrated to satisfy p. In this sense, completeness is broken in NL.
It is known by Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem that the notion of provability
definable in modal logic GL is equivalent to the notion of provability definable in Peano
arithmetic (PA), in sense that GL ` A ↔ PA ` f(A) for all possible f , where f(⊥) = ⊥,
f(p → q) = (f(p) → f(q)) and f(p) = Prov(pf(p)q). Prov refers to a provability
predicate in PA, and f is about translating a sentence into an arithmetical sentence in PA.
Thus, the question is whether the notion of provability definable in PA really is enough for
our purpose. The answer is no. We do need more axioms attached to provability modal
logic to get the right power.
Why is this the case? This is because the intention of the new logic is to resolve paradoxes
in classical logic when comprehension is not restricted. Thus it is natural that PA is
not powerful enough to prove sentences that we intend to prove in the new logic. The
complications in particular arise from the non-exclusion of the full law of excluded middle,
and the next axioms mostly are about new required details on the refined law of excluded
middle. Thus what appear next are additional axioms that would have to be assumed for
the new logic.
• NL1: (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p. This is refinement of Not-1' for ¬ in place of negation
(¬). Converse does not hold always. The reason why converse does not hold always
is that unprovability of a sentence does not always mean that a sentence derives a
contradiction.
• NL2: ¬p ∨ p. This is the law of excluded middle for the provability operator.
Again, the law of excluded middle does not generally hold.
• NL3: (¬p→ ⊥)→ p, (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p. Again, the general Not-1' axiom
schema not involving provability predicates does not hold, and recourse to Refined
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Not-1' and Not-4' is required.
• NL4: p ∨q → (p ∨ q). Quasi-De Morgan's law for .
• NL5: p ∧q ↔ (p ∧ q). Quasi-De Morgan's law for .
• NL6: ¬(p ∨ q) → ¬p ∧ ¬q. De Morgan's law for ¬. Equivalent to NL4 via
the principle of contraposition.
• NL7: ¬p ∨ ¬q ↔ ¬(p ∧ q). De Morgan's law for ¬. Equivalent to NL5 via
the principle of contraposition.
• Law of noncontradiction non-equivalence: This is neither a refinement nor a new
law of the new logic, but a consequence of the new logic. The law of noncontradiction
is not equivalent to ¬(p ∧ ¬p), though when the law of excluded middle is granted,
equivalence does hold. Note also that since De Morgan's laws are valid in the new
logic as well, ¬(p ∧ ¬p) essentially is the re-statement of the law of excluded middle,
which is not granted fully, restricted by the refined law of excluded middle.
• Implication non-equivalence: Again, this is neither a refinement nor a new law of
the new logic. Implication p→ q no longer simply is equivalent to ¬p ∨ q. As will be
with other cases, if the law of excluded middle is granted, then equivalence does hold.
• Refined proof by contradiction: Again, this is a consequence of the new logic,
rather than a law. While proving ¬p by deriving contradiction from p does not hold,
it does hold trivially that falsity of p and ¬p follow from p resulting in contradiction.
In addition, if the law of excluded middle is granted, then one can indeed prove ¬p
from p resulting in contradiction.
Let us review the axioms of the new logic - or one can call it modal logicNL in the following
list. (Note that there is no Not-3' axiom in NL. There is no Then-3 as well. Also, NL7
is excluded, as it is equivalent to NL5, and NL6 is excluded, as it is equivalent to NL4.)
• K: (p→ q)→ (p→ q)
• W: (p→ p)→ p
• Then-1: p→ (q → p)
• Then-2: (p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
• Then-4: (p ↔ (p → r)) → ((p → ⊥) ∧ ((p → r) → ⊥)), with precedence over
Then-2.
• And-1, And-2: p ∧ q → p, p ∧ q → q
• And-3: p→ (q → (p ∧ q))
• Or-1, Or-2: p→ p ∨ q, q → p ∨ q
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• Or-3: (p→ q)→ ((r → q)→ (p ∨ r → q))
• Principle of explosion: ⊥ → p
• Refined Not-1' ¬((p→ ¬p) ∧ (¬p→ p))→ ((p→ ⊥)→ ¬p)
• Not-2': ¬p→ (p→ ⊥)
• Not-4': ((p→ ¬p) ∧ (¬p→ p))→ ¬p ∧ ¬¬p
• Iff-1, Iff-2: (p↔ q)→ ((p→ q) ∧ (q → p))
• Iff-3: (p→ q)→ ((q → p)→ (p↔ q))
• Double negation elimination and introduction: ¬¬p↔ p
• Law of noncontradiction: (p ∧ ¬p)→ ⊥
• De Morgan's laws: ¬(p ∨ q)↔ ¬p ∧ ¬q, ¬(p ∧ q)↔ ¬p ∨ ¬q
• NL1: (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p
• NL2: ¬p ∨p
• NL3: (¬p→ ⊥)→ p, (p→ ⊥)→ ¬p
• NL4: p ∨q → (p ∨ q)
• NL5: p ∧q ↔ (p ∧ q)
with inference rules being modus ponens, uniform substitution and necessitation (` p→ `
p).
2.1 Role of ¬ in Refined Not-1'
Why does Refined Not-1' have ¬ instead of simple negation? The reason is that we
would like to eliminate a model where despite unprovability of a paradox, a paradox is
considered to hold and thus the law of excluded middle is disallowed. We want to keep
Not-1' for all models when classical logic should be considered equivalent to the new logic,
allowing us to continue using proofs based on Not-1' for non-paradoxical circumstances
safely.
3 Paradoxes of classical logic examined in NL
So far, we have stuck with use of truth and falsity as in bivalent classical logic or usual
usages. But it may be beneficial to separate the notion of truth in common language from
the notion of truth in formal logic. After all, when people say, this sentence is false, do
they really use the word false in conventional formal logic understanding? Furthermore,
there really is no suitable truth predicate in formal logic by Tarski's impossibility results[4]
and thus we cannot really say S: ¬T (S), where T is truth predicate. We can only say S:
 6 
¬S. Thus some separation may seem desirable.
We thus explore both notions of truth - formal and common language, without changing
what true and false mean in formal logic. Modal logic provides a possible way that truth
in common language may be interpreted, if we translate p as p being true in common
language, while ¬p as p being false in common language.
But more importantly, how NL resolves paradoxes in classical logic are explored.
3.1 Liar, Russell's, Barber paradox
Sentence S says, S is false. In modal logic NL, S is ¬S, if we make conversion of
the word false to unprovable, with true to provable(). If S is provable, then S
must be unprovable. (S → ¬S. By p → p of modal logic GL, ¬S and thus
S → ¬S, contradiction.) But if S is unprovable, there is no provable contradiction.
Thus, S is determined unprovable (¬S) by axiom Refined Not-1', and furthermore, we
get ¬¬S as well. Also, while S is unprovable, S is true as in conventional formal logic.
Suppose ¬S. Then, ¬S → S from contraposition of ¬S → S by definition of S. By
p→ p, ¬S → S, contradiction. However, assuming S exhibits no provable contradiction.
Thus, S is unprovably true in terms of formal logic.
Suppose we re-define S as ¬S, the usual formulation of liar paradox in classical logic
but examined in NL. Then we basically are examining case of Russell's paradox (with
S substituted with x ∈ x). Since this clearly is a provable paradox, both S and ¬S must
be false in terms of formal logic, since this is the only way axioms remain consistent due to
the law of noncontradiction. Both are unprovable (or false, in terms of common language)
as well by Not-4'.
Barber paradox is identical, as the problem is about S(b) ↔ ¬S(b) where S refers to
shaving and b refers to the barber. Thus, the paradox is resolved in the same way as
Russell's paradox - S(b) and ¬S(b) are false in terms of formal logic. So should the barber
shave herself? The answer is no.
Let us examine Russell's paradox again, with details filled in. Construct set R allowed by
unrestricted comprehension as R = {x|x 6∈ x}. Thus, R ∈ R ↔ R 6∈ R. This is a paradox,
so R and ¬R are both false and unprovable, in terms of formal logic. So should R be an
element of R? The answer is no, because R 6∈ R is false in terms of formal logic.
Barber b is defined as the one who shaves all those, and only those who do not shave
themselves. x not shaving herself is defined as ¬S(x). The question is, given this definition,
¬S(b) ↔ S(b). But since both S(b) and ¬S(b) are false, in terms of formal logic, b is not
included in the set of those who do not shave themselves. Thus, while the barber b should
not shave herself in reality, ¬S(b) is false as well, so b now goes onto shave others who do
not shave themselves peacefully.
3.2 Curry's paradox, Then-4
For this paradox, we will not talk of the common language notion of truth and falsity.
Curry's paradox is that if a sentence C that says C → F exists, then its mere existence
(called curry sentence) without evaluation of its truth or falsity would mean that any claim
can be proven. The idea goes as follows. C ↔ (C → F ) by definition. Thus, C → F must
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be true by Then-2. But (C → F )→ C. Thus C is true, so F is true.
The paradox is avoided in NL by Then-4 that augments Then-2. It is in place to exactly
avoid this circumstance, without restricting comprehension. Thus, C ↔ (C → F ) would
still hold - just that one cannot derive the chain of C and thus C → F therefore F ,
because both C and C → F will be false.
Then-4 simply says that any curry sentence that allows us to prove a target proposition
is false. But this sounds too easy, so why was this resolution not tried?
Consider classical logic. p→ (p→ q) means ¬p ∨ (p→ q). Let ¬p be taken, following the
idea in Then-4. Then (p→ q)→ p means ¬(p→ q)∨ p. ¬p means that ¬(p→ q) must be
taken. This is equivalent to p ∧ ¬q. Thus we get a contradiction. There is no easy escape
in classical logic.
Modal logic NL is different, in that falsity of p does not necessarily imply ¬p, and that
p → q does not necessarily translate to ¬p ∨ q. These changes are quite significant - this
allows us a mean to bypass the above problem in classical logic and falsify a curry sentence,
evaluated true in classical logic, in NL.
3.3 No-no paradox
In the above, we have discussed the no-no paradox[2]. Let us express it in terms of modal
logic NL, with translation of truth in common language to be  and falsity in common
language as ¬. (A) (A) says ¬B. (B) (B) says ¬A. Suppose A is true. Then,
A→ ¬B, thus A→ ¬¬A. Generally, any multiple of ¬¬ applied to A holds from
A. In fact, to generalize further A↔ (¬¬)kA holds.
Suppose instead that ¬A holds. Then, ¬A↔ (¬¬)k¬A.
Suppose that A holds. Then, A↔ (¬¬)kA.
Suppose that ¬A holds. Then, ¬A↔ ¬(¬¬)kA.
This essentially is the hell of unprovability that we cannot really do much of evaluation
unless more is provided. Thus, ¬A, with both A and B turning out to be true, in terms
of formal logic. In common language, we can say that both statements are false. We get
the hell of unprovability of ¬(¬)kA as well.
In fact, this should be expected. We know that if Plato and Socrates are only discussing
A and B that only refer to each other, then they really are discussing truth or falsity that
says nothing much. So the statements must be both false in terms of common language.
But in terms of formal logic, they must be trivially true symmetrically as well, by the fact
that both are acknowledging vacuousness of each other's statements.
• Importance of no-no paradox: The no-no paradox demonstrates that it is heavily
beneficial to translate truth in common language as provable(), and falsity as
unprovable(¬). We get to keep seemingly required symmetry there. Even for
liar paradox, resulting analysis is far smoother (S or ¬S is assigned true), if we
translate false in common language as unprovable. In a way, we really do not have
a good definition of what truth and falsity really are. Common language is very silent
about this, and philosophy is filled with debates about this exact topic. One way of
capturing what truth is would be recourse to how we think of truth in conventional
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understanding of formal logic. Here, we may take a different route and rely on a more
established concept - provability. This choice alone guarantees that we avoid many of
paradoxes.
• While we have separated truth in common language and truth in formal logic, one may
attempt to equate provability with truth directly in formal logic. This alternative path
is achievable by adding φ→ φ to modal logic, but this requires heavy modifications
of NL. While this is doable and sometimes results in simpler analysis, this requires
heavy deviations from classical logic. As matter of balance goes, it is beneficial to
keep NL, and separate notion of truth in common language from that in formal logic.
3.4 Knower and Fitch's Paradox
D: ¬D is known.
E: E is unknown.
Let us write sentence D as K(¬D), with E written as ¬K(E), where K(P ) refers to P is
known. Let us list some common epistemic assumptions used:
• KF: K(P )→ P
• PK: P → K(P )
• CK: K(KF ), K(KF ) ≡ K(K(P )→ P )
• IM: I(KF,P ) ∧ CK → K(P ). I(KF,P ) means P is derivable from KF .
First, consider E first.
K(E)→ E → ¬K(E)
Since we proved a contradiction, in classical logic, we would say that ¬K(E) is proven.
Thus,
¬K(E)→ K(¬K(E))→ K(E)
A paradox, since K(E) ↔ ¬K(E). Modal logic NL disallows such a paradox. We can
prove that assuming a paradox of K(E) ↔ ¬K(E) cannot be proven, paradox does arise
by the above argument, and thus the paradox must be provable. Thus the law of excluded
middle is prohibited, and both K(E) and ¬K(E) must not be true, along with falsity of E
and ¬E. But all assumptions above have been kept.
D is same in this regard that D ↔ ¬D is proved in classical logic. This means that
K(¬D)↔ ¬K(¬D). Again, the same argument applies so D and ¬D must be false, along
with K(¬D) and ¬K(¬D).
• Common language truth: While we can be fine with a sentence and its negation
both being false, those uncomfortable with allowing this circumstance would better be
served if we define truth in common language (as opposed to formal logic) as provable.
Fitch's paradox[1] works similarly - essentially, the paradox proves that all truth must
already be known. The proof involves proving ¬K(p ∧ ¬K(p)) from K(p ∧ ¬K(p)), and
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thereby proving ¬K(p∧¬K(p)) (which is disallowed inNL unless a paradox is unprovable),
which then is used to prove that p → K(p). If we take it true, by an axiom, that there
exists p such that ¬(p→ K(p)) holds and there exists no paradox, then by contraposition,
we reach U ≡ K(p ∧ ¬K(p)). Thus we form a paradox of U ↔ ¬U , and thus both U and
¬U must be false. But note that this line of thought assumes that an instance of p∧¬K(p)
exists.
4 Conclusion
Modal logicNL was constructed as to resolve paradoxes in classical logic, while maintaining
unrestricted comprehension. This construction allows consistent formation of naive set
theory. The major strong point of NL is that expressiveness of common language is kept,
such that we have a good mean of unifying analysis of formal and common language.
Admittedly, while the general philosophy behindNL is simple enough (eliminate paradoxes
as we see), actual construction is not, and along the way we sacrificed completeness - that
if p must be semantically entailed, then p is syntactically entailed (in finite deductions) -
which is not a minor sacrifice. It was shown that paradoxes in common language are more
naturally resolved, if truth in common language refer to provability in formal logic.
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